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Executive Summary 
 
The discussion about governance and anti-corruption reform priorities in developing 
countries has been dominated by a theoretical perspective that can be described as ‘market-
enhancing’ governance. These governance capabilities, also often described as ‘good 
governance’ capabilities could in theory make markets more efficient by reducing transaction 
costs. However, the experience of East Asia shows that ‘market-enhancing’ governance did 
not drive their growth. Indeed there are theoretical reasons why significant improvements in 
market-enhancing governance are unlikely to be achieved in emerging economies. 
 
The East Asian experience suggests instead that sustained growth required ‘growth-
enhancing governance’ capabilities which refer to capabilities for correcting significant 
market failures that constrain growth. The correction of market failures inevitably involves the 
creation of ‘rents’ (policy-created benefits) and the failure of policy can be seen as a failure 
to allocate and withdraw different types of rents effectively. Whenever policy creates rents it 
also induces ‘rent seeking’ (the expenditure of resources by those who want to get access to 
these rents). Policy can only be successful if the rent seeking does not subvert the policy 
intention.  
 
These insights allow us to develop a deeper analysis of corruption. Corruption generally 
refers to the illegal use of public authority by politicians or bureaucrats for their personal 
benefit. But in the context of public policy corruption can be defined as illegal rent seeking, 
where individuals engage in illegal attempts to influence public policy. The standard anti-
corruption strategies assume that corruption is ‘market-constraining’ where officials create 
legal obstacles for businesses that enable them to collect (illegal) bribes. The standard anti-
corruption strategies therefore focus on liberalization, transparency, salary improvements for 
bureaucrats and greater accountability. However, these types of anti-corruption strategies 
have generally yielded poor results in most countries. 
 
The simple analysis of corruption has not been very policy relevant because it has a poor 
analysis of other types of corruption, each with very different drivers. In particular, when 
market failures require formal and informal responses that create rents, ‘state-constraining’ 
corruption is an important variant. This type of corruption can coexist with growth if the 
corruption does not distort potentially beneficial public policy too much, but this type of 
corruption can also destroy growth. The policy response here has to focus on improving 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities to improve the management of critical rents and 
limit or prevent damaging rents. Other types of corruption include political corruption and 
predation and theft, none of which are amenable to standard policy tools. 
 
To establish the importance of this approach for Viet Nam we show that though its recent 
growth is often presented as a market-driven growth experience, Viet Nam’s growth has 
depended on deliberate and sometimes fortuitous responses to market failures. These 
responses inevitably created rents. Some of these rents were potentially ‘growth-enhancing’ 
but others were economically damaging. As the hidden problem of corruption is related to 
the types of rents that exist in the economy, this approach tells us that anti-corruption 
strategies have to be aware of the different types of rents. Anti-corruption strategies have to 
be designed so that growth-enhancing rents are managed in a more effective way while 
damaging rents are limited or squeezed out. 
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1. Introduction 
Viet Nam’s rapid growth over the last two decades has taken it from a war-
ravaged country facing runaway inflation to the threshold of middle-income status. Like 
East Asian countries before it, its growth was not initially based on good governance but 
rather on a number of very specific governance capabilities appropriate for its economic 
strategies. At the juncture it now finds itself in, there are critical questions about the 
direction of governance reforms to sustain its growth. Is it now time for Viet Nam to 
concentrate on good governance reforms such as transparency and accountability to 
reduce general levels of corruption, improvements in rule of law and property right 
stabilization? Or are there more specific governance capabilities that it should focus on 
to strengthen its capabilities for sustaining growth?  
The importance of governance capabilities for sustaining growth is widely 
supported by economists. There are, however, disagreements about the types of 
governance reforms that should be prioritized, the evidence supporting different 
positions, and the feasibility of particular reforms in particular countries. The starting 
point is that existing markets are not able to solve many welfare and growth problems. 
These lost opportunities represent ‘market failures’. Contemporary governance 
approaches hope to address these market failures by general governance reforms that 
aim to make all markets in a country more efficient. These reforms are generally referred 
to as ‘good governance’ and include strengthening state capabilities for enforcing 
property rights, enforcing a rule of law and limiting corruption primarily through improving 
accountability. These goals are desirable in any case, but in addition may in theory 
reduce market transaction costs thereby reducing overall levels of market failures. We 
therefore describe this as the market-enhancing governance agenda. The problem is that 
in practice there may be limits to the extent to which these policies can actually be 
implemented in developing countries, and so it may not be possible to improve market 
efficiency significantly through these reforms. 
It is not surprising that we do not find evidence of developing countries making 
significant improvements in their ‘good governance’ capabilities at early stages of 
development. The historical evidence suggests that the achievement of good 
governance is a very gradual process and successful poor and middle income countries 
focused on specific governance capabilities for addressing particular market failures that 
were most important for them. This may require certain types of corruption to be limited, 
but East Asian countries did not have low levels of corruption overall when their per 
capita incomes were comparable to Viet Nam. The focus of governance capabilities in 
East Asia was on governance capabilities that enabled these states to overcome specific 
market failures. This alternative approach to governance identifies somewhat different 
priorities compared to the good governance approach. We describe this as the growth-
enhancing governance agenda.  
The successful East Asian countries did not have a good rule of law, stable 
property rights across the board or low corruption at an early stage of development, but 
they did have the capability to protect critical property rights, to assist domestic firms to 
acquire and adopt new technologies and limit the detrimental effects of the damaging 
types of corruption. At the same time, Vietnamese experience suggests that Viet Nam 
relied on a number of informal mechanisms to overcome specific market failures. The 
two parts of the analysis are used to identify the types of economic challenges and 
governance reforms that are likely to be most relevant for contemporary Viet Nam. 
 2. Good Governance Reforms 
The institutional capabilities described in the good governance agenda are all 
desirable as ends or goals. It is surely better to live in a society with low levels of 
corruption, a good rule of law and an accountable and democratic political system. Many 
of these conditions can in theory also improve the efficiency of a market economy and 
good governance reforms are therefore ‘market-enhancing governance’ reforms. While 
these are clearly some important goals of development the question is whether they are 
also preconditions of development. Even if in theory these conditions can assist 
development by making markets efficient, they may not be immediately achievable in 
poor countries to an extent that would make a significant impact on economic 
performance. Indeed, the historical evidence is that the core capabilities of good 
governance (stable property rights, rule of law, low corruption, democratic accountability) 
are difficult to improve in the short to medium term.  
 
Figure 1 Theoretical linkages underpinning the good governance agenda 
 
 
 
Some of the important theoretical links between the achievement of good 
governance (or market-enhancing governance) capabilities and development are 
summarized in Figure 1. Efficient markets require that private parties can contract at low 
transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs of making and enforcing contracts. 
Low transaction costs are necessary to allow gains from trade and from productive 
cooperation. Transaction costs will be high if property rights are not protected, so that 
parties do not know if contracts can be enforced, and if the state can make arbitrary 
interventions that change terms of contracts ex post. In turn, property right instability is 
explained by attempts to capture assets or extort incomes through rent seeking and 
corruption. So these too have to be reduced to achieve stable property rights. And finally, 
the persistence of corruption in turn is explained by the absence of democratic 
accountability. Corruption is possible because small groups of people have purchased or 
captured public power, so democratic accountability should in theory make corruption 
and rent seeking more difficult. Clearly, the links in the good governance argument are 
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 potentially plausible and many of these reforms are supported by civil society as ends in 
themselves.  
But what is the evidence that economic success in developing countries was 
based on an improvement of market-enhancing governance capabilities? An extensive 
academic literature has attempted to establish that this was the case (Knack and Keefer 
1995; Mauro 1995; Barro 1996; Clague, et al. 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Johnson, et 
al. 1998; Hall and Jones 1999; Kauffman, et al. 1999; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; 
Lambsdorff 2005). This literature typically finds a positive relationship between market-
enhancing governance conditions and growth. The limitations of this data and these 
types of interpretations have been extensively discussed (Arndt and Oman 2006; Khan 
2007a, 2008; Meisel and Aoudia 2008). The problem for the standard analysis is visually 
summarized in Figure 2. This uses a simple aggregation of the governance indicators 
available for 1996 (the earliest year for which World Bank data are available) and plots 
this against growth rates of per capita incomes over the period 1990 to 2003.  
 
Figure 2 Market-enhancing governance and growth 1990-2003 
 
Market-Enhancing Governance: Composite Property Rights Index and Growth
(using Knack- IRIS data) 1990-2003
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Note: The property right index is an aggregate of the corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality 
indices together with the index of repudiation of government contracts and expropriation risk.  
Sources: World Bank (2005b), World Bank (2005a). 
 
Developing countries are divided into two groups in Figure 2. Rapidly growing 
developing countries are ‘converging’ if their growth rates are higher than the median 
advanced country growth rate and ‘diverging’ if growth is lower. Interestingly, the two 
groups of developing countries do not have significantly different scores on market-
enhancing governance indicators. Advanced countries do have higher scores, but we 
would expect that because greater fiscal resources allow good governance capabilities to 
be effectively implemented. Looking at all countries together it is true that there is a weak 
positive relationship between high scores on market-enhancing governance and higher 
rates of growth, but this relationship is a misleading one. If we look at countries at similar 
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 levels of development, it is hard to discriminate between high growth and low growth 
states by looking at their ‘good governance’ indicators. While we have only presented 
data here for an aggregation of indicators and for one period, this basic story is repeated 
when we look at any set of good governance indicators and any of the periods for which 
data is available (Khan 2004, 2007a).  
For this period, Viet Nam’s weak good-governance score makes it a typical 
converging country, with characteristics that are about average for this group. Governance 
indicators do not exist for the 1960s when East Asian countries were at an equivalent stage 
of development, but case study evidence suggests that scores on good governance 
characteristics like rule of law, democratic accountability, or the overall protection of 
property rights in South Korea or Taiwan at that time would be comparable to contemporary 
converging developing countries. Indeed, even as late as the mid-1980s when the first 
governance indicators became available from Knack and Keefer (1995), South Korea’s 
score was comparable to African countries like the Ivory Coast (Rodrik 1997).  
It is not surprising why developing countries do not manage to achieve high 
scores on good governance indicators. Protecting property rights for all assets and 
enforcing an effective rule of law in a society is very expensive and can only be 
sustained if most assets are very productive and are paying significant taxes to pay for 
their protection. By definition, in a developing country many assets are not productive 
enough to pay significant amounts for their protection. This makes the attempt to achieve 
a rule of law across the board in poor countries financially infeasible (Khan 2004, 2005b).  
Similarly, a reduction of corruption across the board requires fiscal resources to 
pay bureaucrats and politicians at rates that are close to the private sector they are 
supposed to be regulating. And the control of political corruption requires sufficient fiscal 
resources for social democratic electoral strategies to be viable (Khan 2006a, 2006b, 
2006c).  
Finally, achieving high scores on democratic accountability requires a democratic 
system that can deliver to constituents. In most developing countries fiscal resources are not 
sufficient to satisfy the political demands of powerful constituencies. Thus patron-client 
politics and the use of political power to gain access to economic resources outside the 
budget are features of political stabilization in virtually all developing countries (Khan 2005a). 
For all these reasons, developing countries have relatively poor scores in good governance. 
Nevertheless, there are high growth and low growth developing countries, and 
the high growth ones clearly have some governance capabilities that are enabling them 
to sustain growth. These governance capabilities may however have little to do with the 
good governance capabilities identified by the good governance theories. The answer 
may be that growth requires the solution of significant market failures and high growth 
countries had governance capabilities appropriate for addressing some of the most 
significant market failures. 
3. Growth-enhancing governance: an alternative framework  
History as well as economic theory tells us that markets may not be of much use 
for a developing country if there are significant structural factors that prevent markets from 
working effectively. In these cases, the development of markets and good governance 
capabilities may not solve the problems of development because very limited 
improvements in markets may be feasible and significant market failures may remain.  
Any intervention, including those that address market failures inevitably creates 
new income flows as a result. These are ‘rents’, defined as policy-induced income flows 
that would not exist in the absence of that policy. Rents are benefits that some people get 
as a result of specific state policies. Government can create rents for some people by 
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 creating a monopoly, restricting imports, taxing and subsidizing and in other ways. 
Whether the policy is socially damaging or socially beneficial is a different matter. A policy 
(and therefore the rents associated with it) can be socially beneficial if the policy enhances 
net welfare. Some rents like monopoly rents are clearly socially damaging because the 
monopoly reduces social welfare even though the recipients of the monopoly rent are 
better off. Other rents like subsidies to control pollution or enhance technological progress 
may be socially beneficial and the rents may be beneficial for the direct beneficiaries (Khan 
2000a, 2007b). Whether an intervention results in an improvement in growth or welfare 
depends not only on the type of intervention but also on the capabilities of the state to 
manage potentially socially beneficial interventions and rents. 
The management of rents is important because wherever income flows are created, 
individuals and groups will organize and compete to capture or protect these rents. These 
expenditures are described as rent seeking. Rent seeking can be legal, and can take the 
form of lobbying, legal political contributions, the employment of think tanks and journalists 
and other legal mechanisms to influence government policy. But rent seeking can also be 
illegal, when the expenditures to buy influence are illegal. These include not just corruption 
in the simple sense of bribery, but also political corruption where individuals and groups can 
spend resources to acquire political power that in turn allows them to capture rents, or to 
spend resources to acquire coercive power to extract or steal from others, thereby directly 
extracting rents from society. Even potentially beneficial policies creating potentially 
beneficial rents like subsidies for learning can become socially damaging if the rent seeking 
is very extensive or if it succeeds in distorting policies too much, for instance by enabling 
inefficient firms to capture or retain rents that were intended to assist them in acquiring 
technology (Khan 2000b). The important point from the perspective of governance reform is 
that while the creation of some rents (like monopoly rents) triggers new market failures and 
lowers social welfare, other rents (like some government expenditures) may be a response 
to existing market failures and if properly managed can raise social welfare. Growth-
enhancing governance capabilities can be understood as governance capabilities that 
enable states to manage vital corrections to market failures by managing potentially 
beneficial rents in appropriate ways in the face of inevitable rent seeking activities.  
The major challenges are summarized in Figure 3. The failure of policies to 
support growth in many developing countries can be explained in terms of their weak 
governance capabilities to manage the rents that growth policies inevitably create. In 
contrast, the success of East Asian countries was to a large extent due to governance 
capabilities to ‘manage’ rents so that potentially growth-enhancing rents had the desired 
effects. The policy challenge for developing countries today is to learn the lessons from 
East Asia in a nuanced way. Since their initial political and institutional conditions as well 
as international conditions are very different today, a straightforward imitation of East 
Asian policies is not likely to work. Instead, the challenge is to develop appropriate 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities to correct important market failures in an 
effective way. To succeed, policies to correct market failures have to overcome a number 
of problems that could otherwise make them fail. 
First, there has to be mechanisms to reduce the problem of moral hazard. 
Policies to correct market failures often depend on providing incentives to individuals to 
behave in particular ways. A common problem (often described as moral hazard) is when 
individuals appropriate the incentives but do not change their behaviour. For instance, 
subsidies to assist training or making credit lines available to new startup companies to 
overcome market failures may simply be wasted without achieving the desired result. For 
this not to happen, governance capabilities of oversight and policy change are required 
so that the rents created to change incentives are not permanent and may be withdrawn 
if results are not achieved. The more narrowly defined the policy is, the more plausible it 
may be to develop the governance capability to administer the policy reasonably 
effectively. 
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 Figure 3 Strategies for Addressing Specific Market Failures  
 
 
A second problem is the policy-making agencies of government may get captured 
by rent seekers who may engineer ‘solutions’ to market failures that do not really exist, 
simply to benefit from the rents created as a result. For instance, subsidies may be 
created for ‘technology adoption’ by industries that do not need these subsidies. Finally, 
policy responses to market failures may be politically controversial because the solutions 
may benefit particular constituencies or groups and hurt others and this can result in 
political conflicts that can overturn the implementation of the policy. Success requires 
governance capabilities to devise interventions that are the least conflictual and to 
manage conflicts in politically acceptable ways. 
4. The Appropriate Design of Anti-Corruption Strategies  
Anti-corruption has become a major part of governance reforms in developing 
countries for a number of reasons. First, in the market-enhancing or good governance 
policy agenda, anti-corruption plays a vital role in ensuring market efficiency as shown in 
Figure 1. Secondly, aid donors have found it politically very difficult to justify giving aid to 
countries that cannot ensure that aid is not misappropriated. In extreme cases, the 
evidence of significant corruption in their aid programmes can force donors to suspend 
aid given the accountability of aid agencies to their domestic taxpayers. Examples 
include the PCI scandal that resulted in the suspension of Japanese aid in November 
2008 and other instances of corruption have affected World Bank and ADB loans. But 
from the perspective of growth-enhancing governance targeting specific types of 
corruption is important because some types of corruption can disrupt the ability of a state 
to address market failures. However, each of these perspectives can direct our attention 
to very different anti-corruption strategies. The choice of anti-corruption priorities is 
therefore implicitly determined by what we think can be feasibly achieved and the 
priorities that anti-corruption needs to address. 
Corruption is usually defined as the illegal use of public authority and power by 
bureaucrats, politicians and others in positions of public responsibility for their private 
benefit. This definition can cover a vast range of phenomena, ranging from relatively 
innocuous tips and gifts to petty officials to vast sums appropriated by senior officials and 
even expropriation by warlords with guns with possibly very serious consequences for 
the economy and society. To classify the different types of corruption it is useful to first 
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 break down every corrupt ‘transaction’ into two parts shown by the two arrows in Figure 
4.  
 
Figure 4 The two prongs of a corrupt ‘transaction’ 
Public 
Officials
Individuals/ 
Groups
Expenditures to Purchase or Acquire 
Public Power: Can range from bribes to 
efforts to directly capture state power 
Interventions:
Interventions benefiting individuals with power  
can be legal or illegal and 
socially beneficial or damaging  
 
The top arrow shows ‘rent seeking’ expenditures, which are expenditures by 
individuals to either influence public officials or to capture power directly, thereby 
becoming ‘public officials’ themselves. Corruption typically involves illegal rent seeking 
activities. The simplest types of corruption involve the use of bribes to ‘purchase’ 
influence. The expenditures in this part of the transaction are generally illegal (but not all 
of these expenditures need be illegal). In most cases the use of resources to attempt to 
purchase political power or influence also represent at least in part a waste of social 
resources. The waste can be less than the total amount of the bribe because bribes are 
partly simply transfers of resources between individuals. So for instance, bribes can 
sometimes involve transfers from richer people to poorer public servants and can in 
theory be welfare enhancing, but in general we can assume that the rent seeking part the 
transaction is usually socially wasteful.  
The bottom arrow is much more important and shows the types of rents or 
benefits that the public power is then used to ‘purchase’. Much more significant damage 
can be caused by corruption if it supports the creation of damaging rents. Here there is 
considerably more variation than is recognized in the simple theory supporting the policy 
advice for anti-corruption efforts in developing countries. The interventions and rents that 
are supported or altered by rent-seeking activities can in turn be legal or illegal, and the 
effects of these rents and interventions can be socially beneficial or damaging. Note that 
here we are talking about the social welfare associated with particular rents, because all 
rents are privately beneficial for those who receive them. As long as laws were broken in 
either of the prongs shown in Figure 4, the involvement of public officials in these 
activities is corruption. The law is most likely to have been broken along the top arrow, 
and often along the bottom arrow as well. The varieties of interventions that can be 
involved along the bottom arrow are shown in Figure 5. It shows that the 
rents/interventions associated with the corruption (the bottom arrow in Figure 4) can be 
legal or illegal, beneficial or otherwise and it is important to understand these differences 
when designing anti-corruption strategies.  
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 Figure 5 Types of Corruption and Appropriate Policy Responses 
 
Source: Adapted from Khan (2006b: Table 2). 
 
4.1. Market-Restricting Corruption 
The anti-corruption policy coming from the good governance position assumes 
corruption is primarily of this type: the interventions that create the rents in this case are 
legal but they are not socially beneficial. Public officials create legal but market-restricting 
interventions either by mistake or deliberately to create obstacles for investors that they 
have to bribe to get around. In this case the rent seeking by investors (paying bribes) 
provides them with benefits, but the benefit is simply to avoid an unnecessary hurdle. 
The rent in this case is therefore not socially beneficial and it would be better to simply 
get rid of the hurdles directly. Examples would be unnecessary red tape and regulations, 
large numbers of useless forms that need to be filled in, unnecessary inspections of 
factories and so on. These provide opportunities to harass and slow down business, to 
avoid which business may be willing to pay speed money of different types. The bribes in 
the top arrow of Figure 4 in this case are to influence public officials so that they overlook 
private investors sidestepping unnecessary and restrictive regulations. Even if the bribes 
themselves are mainly transfers to underpaid bureaucrats and therefore not necessarily 
directly very damaging in every case, the overall effect of the corruption is likely to be 
damaging. This is because along the bottom arrow the ‘rents’ that are captured are not 
socially beneficial at all and at best allow society to operate closer to the ‘market’ 
outcome that may have been achieved in the absence of corruption. Bribes in this case 
allow private investors to navigate round unnecessary restrictions, for instance 
unnecessary and extensive paperwork but at the cost of lost time and resources involved 
in the bribing.  
Market-constraining corruption is always associated with damaging outcomes 
because both the rents created by the intervention (avoiding hurdles) and the rent 
seeking (bribes to overcome the hurdles) are damaging. The policy package coming 
from the mainstream good governance approach would be applicable in this case. 
Liberalization would help reduce unnecessary state activities that perform no useful 
function. Paying bureaucrats and politicians competitive salaries and developing a good 
system of detection and punishment would raise the opportunity cost of corruption and 
thereby deter corruption. Rule of law reforms, transparency reforms and accountability 
reforms would increase the probability of punishment and therefore reduce the incentives 
for bureaucrats and politicians to be corrupt. These well-known suggestions are plausible 
but the problem is that this type of corruption is likely to be a small part of the overall 
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 spectrum of corruption in a developing country. Moreover, the package of reforms that 
are required to reduce this type of corruption are quite demanding for most developing 
countries, in particular the requirement that it is not sufficient to pay bureaucrats and 
politicians more, but also to have credible detection and punishment systems. 
4.2. State-constraining corruption 
There are many state activities that are essential for growth and development, 
and many of these activities are legal. The corruption associated with these types of 
interventions raises a different set of challenges. While all economists agree that there 
are essential public goods that states have to provide, the analysis of market failures in 
developing countries suggests a more extensive set of beneficial interventions to 
accelerate growth and development. When states engage in these interventions (along 
the bottom arrow in Figure 4) they create potentially beneficial rents. But these rents 
imply in turn rent seeking activities (competition to capture rents) to influence the type or 
allocation of these rents. Rent seeking can be illegal, involving bribes or kickbacks to 
influence public officials, but it can also be legal involving lobbying or legal contributions 
to political parties, and both are expenditures along the top arrow of Figure 4.  
The net outcome of state-constraining corruption (and rent seeking in general) 
can be positive or negative. We can identify two polar extremes with most cases lying 
somewhere in between. At one end would be a state that was ‘autonomous’ such that it 
could determine and change policies (and therefore the allocation of benefits) according 
to its own criteria. Corruption and rent seeking in this case would provide kickbacks to 
public officials but would not necessarily determine the allocation or management of the 
rent because public officials would have an incentive to allocate and manage rents to 
maximize their kickbacks or taxes over time. They would have no incentive to provide 
rents to inefficient firms because efficient firms would be able to provide them with bigger 
bribes or taxes over time. In this case state-constraining corruption could be associated 
with moderately good growth outcomes. South Korea or Taiwan in the 1960s would 
come close to this polar extreme, where policies were not subverted by rent seeking but 
where there was plenty of evidence of corruption whereby public officials received 
kickbacks from firms benefiting from incentives. However, if the firms did not perform, 
kickbacks would not help these firms and they would lose their benefits to other firms or 
sectors (Khan 1996, 1998, 2000b).  
At the other extreme would be a politically weak state where rent seeking 
expenditures by actual and potential beneficiaries determined policy and blocked 
changes in policy. In this variant, state-constraining corruption would be associated with 
poor performance because inefficient groups would be able to use corruption or legal 
forms of rent seeking to block policy changes or rents that harmed them. The problem 
here is not the corruption but the power of the inefficient to buy influence to block 
changes that harmed them. Indeed, even without any corruption, legal rent seeking by 
powerful firms could result in exactly the same effect. Most developing countries are 
somewhere in between these two extremes, but the closer they are to the second pole, 
the weaker their growth-enhancing governance capabilities are likely to be. The 
subversion of potentially beneficial state policies through corruption and rent seeking is 
therefore a manifestation of weak growth-enhancing governance capabilities. 
State-constraining corruption can therefore be associated with either growth or 
stagnation. This is exactly what is demonstrated by the available empirical evidence such 
as in Figure 2. While it would be very desirable if there were no corruption or rent 
seeking at all when the state creates potentially beneficial rents, it is unrealistic to expect 
there to be no rent seeking when policy interventions inevitably create rents. If the rent 
seeking is inevitable, the objective is to limit the damaging effects of the rent seeking 
rather than to get rid of the potentially beneficial intervention and rents. In the longer run, 
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 the objective is to convert most of the rent seeking into legal rent seeking in this case, so 
the process of rent seeking can be transparent and regulated. Clearly, the policy 
response here cannot be to liberalize to get rid of the rents because in this case the 
interventions are potentially beneficial. Paying bureaucrats more may help, but only if it 
was linked to the creation of appropriate bureaucratic capabilities for managing the 
necessary interventions.  
The most effective immediate policy response here would be to make sure that 
the bargaining over rents does not subvert the policy of correcting market failures. The 
aim must be to identify critical growth-enhancing policies and to strengthen the 
capabilities of states to respond to rent seeking in ways that maintain growth. 
Transparency and accountability may sometimes help if both the rents and the rent 
seeking can be potentially legalized. In these cases, the rent seeking can then be 
regulated by developing appropriate governance capabilities so that growth is sustained. 
For instance, if industrial policy is based on the legal provision of assistance to high 
technology industries, then the lobbying of different industries who want to be classified 
as high-technology industries can also be made legal. However, if there are legal limits to 
some types of rent creation (for instance WTO rules can make it difficult for developing 
countries to assist technology acquisition), then it may be difficult to make all of the rent 
seeking legal too. These are structural problems that many developing countries face, 
and they require pragmatic solutions.  
4.3. Political Corruption  
A major problem for developing countries is that there are many types of rent 
allocations that are potentially beneficial but which cannot be immediately legalized for 
various reasons. Political corruption takes place when public officials are involved in rent-
creating activities that cannot be legalized but which are politically or economically 
necessary. This would be the case where politics creates rents for powerful 
constituencies whose satisfaction is necessary if social conflict is to be avoided. Although 
political corruption is politically undesirable in the long-run, the immediate net economic 
effect of political corruption can be positive if stopping this rent creation had damaging 
effects of political stability. Clearly political stability has significant economic benefits and 
in developing countries this typically involves allowing significant rents to be created for 
powerful constituencies through off-budget transfers and accumulation opportunities for 
powerful constituencies (Khan 2005a). Here the significant difference with advanced 
countries is that in the latter, the budget is big enough to allow competing parties to offer 
credible spending plans to voters that can potentially win one of them a majority. But in 
developing countries fiscal resources are insufficient to satisfy the redistributive demands 
coming from powerful organized groups. Patron-client politics often involving rent-
creation for powerful constituencies are processes through which political stability 
maintained. In one-party states, the internal political distributions that maintain political 
stability are even more difficult to observe or make transparent.  
The mechanisms through which political corruption works can take many forms 
and vary across countries. In terms of Figure 4, the top arrow in this case refers to a 
variety of expenditures by powerful factions and political entrepreneurs to organize 
followers and achieve political power. Payoffs along the bottom arrow are privileges and 
rents created for powerful constituencies. If one or both of these arrows involves illegal 
activities, corruption is involved. But for structural reasons, the corruption in this case 
cannot be either stopped or easily legalized and made transparent. This is because 
political stability has to be achieved somehow, but fiscal constraints mean credible 
promises to all those who are powerful cannot be made through the budget. This 
structural problem affects all developing countries and makes the political process 
structurally subject to significant amounts of political corruption. 
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 In societies like Viet Nam where politics is organized through a one-party 
structure, the internal distribution of benefits to party members is the mechanism through 
which political stability and order is maintained. Some of these internal rent allocations 
can be legal; others may have the character of political corruption. Targeting all types of 
political corruption in developing countries before these countries have an adequate 
fiscal base for maintaining political stability through social democratic policies is not 
realistic. However, to the extent that some instances of political corruption can overlap 
with the state-constraining corruption discussed above, the development of growth-
enhancing governance capabilities may involve reducing or targeting specific instances 
of political corruption.  
Political corruption and state-constraining corruption are often closely 
overlapping. For instance, in some cases where successful firms get vital state 
assistance that helps them to improve their technology and viability, political corruption 
can be an overlapping profit sharing arrangement between political players and private 
firms. Here rents for firms achieve technological progress and some of these rents are 
transferred to powerful political players to achieve political stability. In these cases while 
the corruption is still undesirable, the economic damage can be limited. But in other 
cases political corruption can result in the construction of poor infrastructure, the 
protection of inefficient enterprises, and in extreme cases predatory behaviour of the type 
that we will discuss as the fourth type of corruption. In these cases, the rents to failing 
firms are socially damaging, and the sharing of some of these rents with powerful 
political players through political corruption makes it more difficult to discipline or remove 
these rents. Growth-enhancing policies require these types of corruption to be 
significantly reduced.  
Like state-constraining corruption, political corruption is not always the result of 
limited transparency and accountability. Indeed, sometimes this type of corruption can be 
directly driven by the responsiveness of the political leadership to powerful groups in 
society. In these cases political corruption will not be reduced by democratic 
accountability, and indeed this is the evidence of democratization in many developing 
countries. Nor is it necessarily going to be reduced by higher salaries for public officials 
or strategies of increasing the opportunity costs of corruption since in this case 
bureaucrats engage in corruption in close cooperation with their political masters. The 
importance of this type of corruption in developing countries explains why standard anti-
corruption strategies often have negligible effects on aggregate measures of corruption.  
4.4. Predation and theft 
The most damaging type of corruption occurs when ‘public officials’ engage in 
activities that create rents which are both damaging and illegal. Corruption in this case 
takes the form of predatory activities and theft. Predatory corruption and theft are always 
damaging. Here the upper arrow in Figure 4 represents expenditures that sustain the 
political and military power that is then used in the lower arrow to transfer income and 
wealth in predatory ways to themselves (the damaging ‘rents’ in this case). Thus, 
warlords seek rents by spending resources on maintaining their armies (their rent 
seeking expenditures) and then capture resources from society (their rents). Here the 
economic consequences can be seriously negative and can rapidly impoverish the 
economy. Any state that is stable enough to think beyond the present can be expected to 
curb these types of corruption in its own self-interest. So while some instances of 
predation and theft can be found in all states, sometimes overlapping with types of 
political corruption, this type of corruption only becomes significant in states which have 
already begun to fall apart.  
As a result, when societies begin to exhibit this type of corruption, standard anti-
corruption strategies are once more inappropriate. Here the relevant policy has to be to 
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 strengthen the centralized power of the state, sometimes to build it from scratch. 
Fortunately, Viet Nam is not one of these countries. Nevertheless, there are likely to be 
instances of theft and predation in all countries and this is a type of corruption for which 
zero tolerance is politically feasible and entirely warranted.  
4.5. Anti-corruption policy challenges  
Anti-corruption policy is most likely to succeed if it is targeted very carefully 
against specific types of corruption that are constraining economic performance rather 
than if it broadly targeted all types of corruption. It is easier to focus genuine political 
effort against very damaging types of corruption. While all corruption is undesirable, 
progress towards that goal has to be steady and pragmatic, and the perspective of 
growth-enhancing governance can allow the design of pragmatic policies that identify a 
small number of specific areas that need immediate attention. 
The priorities of anti-corruption policy in a country depend on the types of 
corruption that are most important. This in turn depends on the types of rents that are 
dominant in the economy. For instance, if monopoly rents and rents created by 
restrictions on economic activity dominate, most of the corruption in that society would be 
market-restricting types of corruption. In this case, the good governance anti-corruption 
strategy may indeed be the appropriate response. If on the other hand many potentially 
beneficial interventions and rents are evident, then state-constraining corruption may be 
an important problem. In this case, strengthening state capabilities to solve these market 
failures more effectively would be the priority. Some areas of corruption may need to be 
targeted as a priority, but accountability and the threat of prosecution may not be 
sufficient for the reasons discussed earlier. While zero corruption may not be achievable 
in the presence of a significant extent of necessary rents, anti-corruption policy here 
should focus on building institutions and capabilities that ensured that corruption did not 
protect moral hazard or enable the capture of policy benefits by inefficient producers.  
Political corruption is likely to be widespread in all developing countries and we 
would expect to see rents created for politically powerful organizers and factions. It may 
be very difficult to make a significant impact on political corruption in the short term but 
improving fiscal capacity would be a starting point. It may also be important to address 
some types of political corruption when these overlap with damaging state-constraining 
corruption. Any finally, if there is a significant amount of predatory corruption, 
strengthening the central policing capabilities of the state would be the priority. This is 
very important in countries facing state collapse but likely to be less significant in 
relatively strong states like Viet Nam. 
Since corruption is politically sensitive because of its links with political 
processes, a step-by-step and narrowly defined anti-corruption strategy that targets 
specific areas of corruption may be the only feasible way of addressing growth-reducing 
corruption. A head-on attack on all types of corruption may get superficial political 
support from a country’s political elites but the experience from many developing 
countries suggests that such broadly based policies have little chance of success.  
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 5. Vietnam: The Role of Rents and Anti-Corruption Policy 
To identify the types of corruption that may have dominated in Viet Nam, we need 
to look at the types of rents that may have been driving or constraining growth over the 
last two decades. The evidence suggests that the transition to growth in Viet Nam cannot 
be explained in a simple way by liberalization doing away with unnecessary state 
restrictions (and implicit monopoly rents). Rather, the story appears to be more complex. 
Viet Nam in the 1980s benefited from a range of implicit interventions that in a deliberate 
or accidental way created solutions for significant market failures. These solutions had 
rents associated with them and we should therefore not be surprised that some of these 
rents resulted in efforts to capture or influence the allocation of these rents. In a 
developing country some of this influencing activity is often hidden and not regulated by 
law, and therefore by definition can be classified as corruption. If this type of corruption 
was important in Viet Nam, policy-relevant research would aim to identify the extent to 
which state-constraining corruption affected the achievement of growth. The priority for 
this type of corruption would be to improve the capability of the economy to sustain or 
even accelerate growth. If on the other hand, more damaging types of rents 
predominated in Viet Nam, other responses including liberalization may be appropriate 
anti-corruption strategies.  
Viet Nam’s growth experience dates from the late 1980s with the process of pha 
rao or the ‘breaking of fences’ that gave public enterprises greater freedom to market 
their products, leading eventually to the formal announcement of doi moi in 1986. This 
was the beginning of a growing formal recognition and encouragement of the private 
sector and towards enterprise autonomy for the SOE sector (Tran 1999: 43-7; Rama 
2008: 13-23). The outcome of reform efforts was a significant change in the policy 
framework that enabled growth to accelerate around 1990 and remain high for almost 
two decades before the effects of the global downturn of 2008 began to be felt.  
Table 1 shows Viet Nam’s growth relative to other countries. For the period 1985-
2005, Viet Nam’s growth was second only to China. However, China has a per capita 
income almost three times higher than Viet Nam, and Thailand and Malaysia are even 
further ahead. Viet Nam’s current per capita income is closer to that of India. 
 
Table 1 Viet Nam’s Recent Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective 
Viet Nam China Thailand Malaysia East Asia
All 
Developing India
Advanced 
Countries
GDP Per Capita 2006 
Current Dollars 700 2000 3050 5620 1856 1997 820 38190
Population 2006 millions 84.1 1311.8 63.4 26.1 1898.9 5507.4 1109.8 944.4
GDP Per Capita Growth
1985-1990 2.5 6.4 8.9 4.1 5.9 1.3 3.9 3.1
1990-1995 6.0 10.8 7.1 6.5 8.7 1.5 3.2 1.3
1995-2000 5.2 7.2 -1.8 1.1 4.8 2.5 4.0 2.3
2000-2005 5.8 8.5 4.5 2.7 7.2 3.9 5.2 1.4
1985-2005 5.3 8.1 4.3 4.0 6.6 2.1 3.8 1.9  
Source: World Bank (2008) 
 
Opening up, allowing greater enterprise autonomy and creating rewards for risk 
taking were all important contributors to Viet Nam’s growth. A common interpretation of 
this experience is to suggest that market reforms were responsible for Viet Nam’s growth 
by allowing the country to produce according to its comparative advantage. The 
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 implication is that even greater exposure to the market through liberalization and 
improvements in market-enhancing governance will sustain growth and take it forward. A 
closer look at the context in which growth took place in Viet Nam throughout this period 
shows that liberalization and efficient markets alone cannot explain the sustained growth 
acceleration in the country. In particular, growth was driven by FDI looking for rent 
opportunities within Viet Nam. In addition, accidental rents like those created by the MFA 
solved critical market failures and allowed Viet Nam to develop labour-intensive 
industries. Finally, Viet Nam did not conform to the ‘good governance’ conditions 
theoretically necessary for efficient market growth.  
 
Table 2 shows how Viet Nam fared in terms of good governance indicators in 
1996, around the time when its growth acceleration began. This is the first year for which 
a broad data base of comparative governance data is available from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) data set of the World Bank. Viet Nam’s relative ranking 
against a number of high-growth countries over the period 1985-2005 is also shown 
graphically in Figure 6 through to Figure 11. 
 
Table 2 Viet Nam’s Relative Performance in Conventional Governance Indicators 1996 
 
Source: World Bank (2005b; 2008) 
 
The WGI indicators measure performance in terms of market-enhancing 
governance. The data demonstrate a number of interesting features. First, developing 
countries score significantly lower on all market-enhancing governance indicators 
compared to advanced countries (also shown in Figure 2). Secondly, the scores given to 
the same country by different studies vary greatly, and this is reflected in large standard 
errors for each indicator in the WGI data base. In many cases, the standard errors are so 
big that we are not able to say if differences between developing countries are 
statistically significant (Table 1). The only exceptions are Voice and Accountability and 
Rule of law, where Viet Nam and China score lower than the other countries, and 
political stability where they score higher. The scores of Viet Nam and China could reflect 
the fact that they are the only one-party states in our sample. 
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Figure 6 Viet Nam’s Governance Performance 1996: Voice and Accountability 
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Note: Vn = Viet Nam, Ch = China, Tld = Thailand, Ml = Malaysia and Ind = India. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
 
 
Figure 7 Viet Nam’s Governance Performance 1996: Political Stability  
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Note: Vn = Viet Nam, Ch = China, Tld = Thailand, Ml = Malaysia and Ind = India. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
 
 
Figure 8 Viet Nam’s Governance Performance 1996: Government Effectiveness  
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Note: Vn = Viet Nam, Ch = China, Tld = Thailand, Ml = Malaysia and Ind = India. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
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 Figure 9 Viet Nam’s Governance Performance 1996: Regulatory Quality  
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Note: Vn = Viet Nam, Ch = China, Tld = Thailand, Ml = Malaysia and Ind = India. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
 
 
Figure 10 Viet Nam’s Governance Performance 1996: Rule of Law  
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Note: Vn = Viet Nam, Ch = China, Tld = Thailand, Ml = Malaysia and Ind = India. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
 
 
Figure 11 Viet Nam’s Governance Performance 1996: Control of Corruption  
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Note: Vn = Viet Nam, Ch = China, Tld = Thailand, Ml = Malaysia and Ind = India. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
 
 
David Dollar’s (2002) argument that Viet Nam’s growth slowed down in the 1990s 
because of its lower scores on good governance relative to India, China and Thailand is 
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 questionable given these large standard errors. For most indicators Viet Nam did not 
score significantly worse than its comparators in the 1990s and these high-growth 
developing countries did not in turn have significantly better scores compared to the 
developing country average. Thus, neither Viet Nam’s growth takeoff nor the slowdown 
later on can be explained by its performance in good governance.  
The importance of market failures are underlined for instance in the Investment 
Climate Surveys for 2006 where most businesses identify access to finance, land, 
infrastructure and skilled personnel as important constraints to doing business (Joint 
Donors 2007: 73-4). When rents are associated with responses to market failure, the 
rents may be growth-promoting. Other rents may signal inefficiency. A number of 
features of Viet Nam’s growth since 1990 point to the types of rents that may have 
contributed to growth or slowed it down. First, Viet Nam’s growth since 1990 was 
primarily driven by relatively small firms using labour-intensive technologies (Belser 
2000; Harvard Vietnam Program 2008: 34). This is often interpreted as proof that growth 
was driven by rent-free competitive markets. In fact, market-driven growth only works 
when technological capabilities can be developed by overcoming critical market failures 
constraining technology acquisition.  
Secondly, an important mechanism through which this happened was the MFA. 
This created important fortuitous rents for the garment industry when Viet Nam was 
granted reduced-duty access to Europe and the USA and quota free access to the USA 
(Nadvi, et al. 2004a; Nadvi, et al. 2004b). The implicit rents attracted investment and 
allowed learning in the garment sector. It is therefore wrong to represent the growth of 
the garment industry as being entirely driven by free markets and comparative 
advantage. Yet, success in labour-intensive industries has been used to support WTO 
accession and other bilateral free-trade agreements (Flatters 1997; Joint Donors 2007: 
49-58). In fact Viet Nam’s experience shows the importance of temporary rents to attract 
investment and technology even in labour-intensive sectors. 
Thirdly, Viet Nam enjoyed significant foreign inflows in the form of FDI and aid. 
FDI reached 10.2 billion dollars in 2006, and was bigger as a share of GDP than FDI in 
China (Joint Donors 2001: 6, 2007: 72). Viet Nam has also been one of the biggest 
recipients of aid in absolute terms. Aid through budget support was an important source 
of rents that financed pro-poor policies which in turn helped the state to sustain pro-
growth strategies (Joint Donors 2007: 29-33). The FDI often came in search of fortuitous 
rents as in the garments sector or rents in protected domestic markets.  
Fourthly, almost all large domestic firms were in the SOE sector. Many had 
access to significant rents because of their market power and implicit subsidies. Yet the 
SOE sector also took the lead in driving reform. Some SOEs used rents available to 
them to upgrade technology and move up the value chain. They performed less well than 
private companies, but collectively registered growth unlike many other developing 
countries (Harvard Vietnam Program 2008: Table 5). The majority of SOEs were also 
profitable (Joint Donors 2007: 62). But in many cases damaging rents also emerged, 
based on monopoly pricing or speculative forays into real estate and stock markets. The 
reorganization of SOEs into a number of giant conglomerates in 2006 is unlikely to make 
them more productive or efficient (Harvard Vietnam Program 2008: 30-1). 
Finally, Viet Nam remains an effective and legitimate one-party state, where the 
political system has been successful in remaining legitimate by delivering high rates of 
growth. The internal distribution of power and resources within the party has maintained 
political stability, though some privileges captured by politically powerful individuals are 
rents, and some of the processes through which rents were allocated or captured may be 
judged to have been corrupt (Harvard Vietnam Program 2008).  
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 Figure 12 Governance and Growth in Viet Nam: Patterns and Vulnerabilities  
 
 
Growth in Viet Nam was therefore driven by complex factors and not just 
liberalization. There is evidence that a range of rents played a critical role in driving 
growth, though there were also rents that damaged growth. The important rents and the 
governance structures that determined how they were ‘managed’ are summarized in 
Figure 12. While growth was high, labour productivity and its rate of growth was very low. 
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 Between 1993 and 1997 value-added per worker increased by a total of 54 per cent 
(Belser 2000: Table 4) but this figure reflected the absorption of under-employed 
agricultural labour into manufacturing. Value-added per worker in manufacturing 
decreased from 57 per cent of the Chinese level in 1990 to 40 per cent in 2000 (Jenkins 
2004: Table 6). Given that Viet Nam is a poorer economy with lower initial productivity in 
manufacturing, the slow growth of manufacturing productivity is a problem. Between 
1990 to 2000, total factor productivity for the economy as a whole grew at only 1.1 per 
cent per annum (Joint Donors 2001: Table 1.3). We now look at some of the significant 
sources of rents to see how they can explain some of these economic features of Viet 
Nam’s growth and the constraints it faces.  
5.1. SOE Responses to Market Failures: Growth with Constraints  
Viet Nam’s reform effort was initiated by its SOEs with the tacit support of 
pragmatic party officials (Rama 2008). This fact explains much about the relative 
dynamism and pragmatism of the Vietnamese SOEs compared to SOEs in many other 
developing countries. Having broken free of the Soviet type planning system, many 
SOEs used their growing autonomy to search and develop new opportunities for making 
money. In this they faced the expected raft of market failures in the context in which they 
found themselves, but their access to substantial rents and pre-existing organizational 
structures allowed some to find ways of upgrading technologies, making new 
investments and enhancing output. But many SOEs were less dynamic, relying on rents 
to protect jobs and inefficiency and failing to create opportunities to raise themselves into 
more viable and dynamic economic trajectories.  
The rents available to SOEs came from a variety of sources. First, SOEs typically 
enjoyed market power because they were selling products that were protected in 
domestic markets. Second, the implicit government guarantee of SOE debt as well as 
their access to state owned banks meant that SOEs had access to easier and cheaper 
credit, giving them implicit rents. Thirdly, SOEs possessed critical assets like land and 
access to natural resources that gave them a significant advantage over potential 
entrants from the private sector or foreign firms particularly in some critical sectors. 
Finally, SOEs were organized within ‘Enterprise Unions’ in their line ministries, which 
were the precursors of the General Corporations. The financial cross-subsidization of 
firms within Unions and the sharing of expertise and learning experiences provided 
implicit rents that were sometimes used to acquire technology.  
Cheshier and Penrose provide examples of how successful garment factories 
were encouraged to effectively cross-subsidize and assist lagging ones into new higher 
value adding lines like suits, merge with poorly performing enterprises, and offer 
management assistance (2007: 14-15, 27-28). One of the remarkable examples of using 
internal rents to achieve learning was Vinashin, the General Corporation responsible for 
shipbuilding. It decided in the 1990s that it would move Viet Nam’s fledgling shipbuilding 
industry with its focus on river boats into a global player making ships. To do this, the 
Corporation had to spend substantial internal resources to explore technologies, market 
Viet Nam as a potential shipbuilding country and even construct a sample ship that 
sailed round the world picking up potential customers (Cheshier and Penrose 2007: 14, 
30). In other sectors, mergers were used to mop up poorly performing enterprises that 
had no chance of achieving profitability. Thus while the objective of most Vietnamese 
General Corporations and SOEs was often simply to protect jobs and maintain 
profitability, the effect was in many cases to upgrade technologies and finance learning 
in a context where market failures precluded other ways of doing this. However, while 
some SOEs like Vinashin was initially quite successful in technology acquisition, the 
recent performance of Vinashin and its levels of indebtedness has raised serious 
questions as to whether rents continue to be well-used by this SOE. This raises the 
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 importance of having a better understanding of the uses of rents within the SOEs so that 
the Vietnamese state can have a better understanding of whether society is getting a 
good return from the rents that it makes available to particular SOEs. 
However, the SOE sector clearly also suffered from problems because 
unregulated rents can create adverse incentives and these have been frequently 
identified in the literature on this sector in Viet Nam. A growing source of rents from the 
late 1990s was from speculation in nascent stock markets and property bubbles. Access 
to land is a major constraint on growth in developing countries and land rights are difficult 
to define efficiently in all developing countries (Khan 2009). Viet Nam as a socialist 
country has specific issues in defining land rights adequately to achieve high growth 
while maintaining social stability. These speculative investments allowed inflated balance 
sheets to be used to finance risky credit-based expansion (Cheshier and Penrose 2007: 
17-22). Given the privileged position that SOEs have in getting access to valuable land, 
this is a major source of rents that SOEs can capture in Viet Nam. These may be useful 
rents if they allowed rapid changes in land use in the direction of greater productivity, but 
only if Vietnamese policy-makers have the governance capabilities to track land use and 
ensure that recipients of land do not engage in speculative land accumulation (which 
results in the creation of damaging rents). The protection of domestic markets of SOEs 
through a variety of measures also meant that rents were created in protected domestic 
markets. This could be potentially growth-enhancing if domestic market rents allowed 
learning to commence and was combined with pressures for technology acquisition. But 
protection could also imply damaging rent creation if Vietnamese SOEs remained 
excessively inward-oriented in which case the rent creation through protection would turn 
out to be damaging (Belser 2000: 27). More serious is the possibility that close 
connections between SOEs and political power could be used to appropriate public 
assets in ways that are difficult to observe and possibly with negative implications for 
productivity growth (Harvard Vietnam Program 2008: 3).  
The overall assessment of Viet Nam’s SOE sector therefore has to be nuanced. 
On the one hand the sector as a whole is profitable. A survey of 44 major SOEs in Ho 
Chi Minh City in the mid-2000s showed an average profit rate of almost 7 per cent (Joint 
Donors 2007: 62). We have also referred to examples of technology upgrading, 
aggressive searching for new markets and the achievement of export and sales growth. 
Of the top 200 firms in Viet Nam in 2007, 122 were SOEs, 56 were foreign owned and 
only 22 were domestic private firms. Most of the latter were banks (Cheshier and 
Penrose 2007: 6). On the other hand, the availability of some types of damaging rents 
and the absence of any overt regulation even of the potentially beneficial rents could 
have resulted in hidden internal corruption in the relationship between politically powerful 
individuals and groups and SOEs that could be state-constraining or even predatory. 
Given the overall performance of the sector, our hunch is that the predatory variant of 
corruption is not dominant but the state-constraining corruption may be damaging in 
some cases because of weak institutions and productive incentives. The growth of total 
factor productivity is a crude and imperfect measure, but to the extent that it reveals the 
pace of upgrading, TFP growth has been low in Viet Nam, being just above 1 per cent for 
the economy as a whole over the period 1990 to 2000 (Joint Donors 2001: Table 1.3).  
The SOE experience shows how some firms, perhaps because of good 
leadership at the level of the firm or the General Corporation overseeing the firm used 
available rents to assist technology upgrading in a context of serious market failures. The 
only regulators of these rents were the General Corporations themselves and the implicit 
internal competition and negotiation within the Communist Party. But the General 
Corporations were primarily interested in the welfare of the firms under them and not 
necessarily in the national economy. It seems to have been a matter of luck and 
leadership quality of particular corporations that determined the aggressive use of rents 
for seeking out new markets, products and technologies. The internal processes within 
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 the Communist Party could perhaps also have played a role in regulating rent creation 
strategies across sectors but little is known of the negotiation structure within the party in 
the published literature. Given the complex internal structure of the Party, a 
recommendation of greater transparency may not be immediately implementable, but a 
greater understanding of the ways in which rents can be beneficially used and the uses 
that are damaging may help the party to internally regulate and limit the damaging 
variants of state-constraining corruption in the short to medium term.  
5.2. Fortuitous Learning Rents: Trade Agreements and Low Technology Exports  
Viet Nam made spectacular progress in the 1990s in a number of low technology 
export sectors, in particular garments, but also in footwear, electronics assembly and 
some agro-industries like catfish and coffee. The spur to this takeoff came from a 
number of preferential agreements on trade that benefited Viet Nam during this period. 
These included the preferential garments quotas that Viet Nam was offered by the 
European Union in 1992 and in particular the bilateral trade agreement that Viet Nam 
signed with the USA (USBTA) in 2000. These types of trade agreements that give some 
developing countries generous quotas or quota-free access or lower tariffs when 
relatively more advanced developing countries face restrictions obviously create 
significant rents for export-oriented industries in the preferred countries.  
These ‘fortuitous’ trade related rents can be very important for overcoming some 
specific market failures in learning that can preclude setting up even low technology 
industries. Market failures in capital markets and in markets for knowledge may preclude 
investments in these industries if low labour productivity implies high unit costs of 
production despite low wages. These costs of production and quality improvements can 
only come about through a process of learning-by-doing. But this requires either loss-
making investments by risk-loving investors who can take a long view or the emergence of 
accidental rents of the type that preferential trade agreements can give to developing 
countries when other developing countries suffer restricted access. Preferential trade rents 
can allow producers in these countries to begin to produce at a competitive price for foreign 
markets enabling learning-by-doing so that eventually the sector can survive without rents. 
Clearly, free trade agreements have to be discriminatory if they are to create 
effective learning rents for newcomers. This important point is often not well understood. 
Developing countries which enjoy high growth rates with a free trade agreement that is 
discriminatory in their favour can make the mistake of believing that their growth was 
driven by free markets. They may even believe that a comprehensive set of free trade 
agreements will deepen their export-oriented success. This may not follow at all if other 
developing countries are also signing free trade agreements at the same time. The 
importance given to trade agreements in many countries is based on a misunderstanding 
in international policy circles that free trade will help developing countries to achieve 
industrialization using labour-intensive technologies.  
The initial effects of preferential free trade agreements were dramatic for Viet 
Nam when these agreements gave Viet Nam implicit rents. After Viet Nam signed the 
free trade agreement with the USA in 2000, exports to the USA increased by 28 per cent 
in 2001 and then by 128 per cent in 2002 (Pincus and Thang 2004: 15). This experience, 
together with other international evidence such as Bangladesh’s entry into the garments 
industry in the 1980s suggests that even in the case of relatively simple labour intensive 
technologies, the entry of poor countries very often depends on temporary rent 
opportunities that allow them to initiate learning-by-doing processes.  
One aspect of Viet Nam’s entry into low technology export-oriented sectors is the 
relatively significant presence of foreign investors even in these sectors. For instance, in 
2001, 28.2 per cent of garment and textile output in Viet Nam was in foreign-owned 
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 firms, 48.5 per cent in state owned enterprises and only 23.3 per cent in domestic private 
firms (Nadvi, et al. 2004a: Table 1). From 2000 to 2005 the share of the private sector 
(domestic and foreign) in manufacturing increased from 57 per cent to 65 per cent, and 
though the domestic private sector was described as ‘buoyant’, the foreign owned 
component of the private sector clearly remains the dominant partner in terms of 
technology and productivity (Joint Donors 2007: 72).  
The presence of foreign investors even in low technology sectors is noteworthy 
and different from some other developing countries at early stages of development. For 
instance, the garment and textile sector is almost entirely domestically owned in 
Bangladesh, which means that many more domestic entrepreneurs are learning about 
international business, quality control, financial management and so on, and many of 
them will acquire skills to move on from this sector when the next tier of garment 
producers emerge in another country. In contrast, foreign investors still dominate in low 
technology sectors in Viet Nam, not just in garments and textiles but also in other sectors 
like footwear (Cheshier and Penrose 2007: 7). 
The presence of foreign investors can be an advantage because there could be 
significant technology transfer to domestic firms through partnerships and joint ventures. 
It is not surprising that when Vietnamese private firms show evidence of moving up the 
value chain they have usually been assisted by foreign firms as partners or as suppliers 
of superior inputs. For instance, in the garment industry some Vietnamese firms have 
been able to move up the value chain because of investments by South Korean and 
Taiwanese investors in textiles, which lowered the domestic price of higher quality fabrics 
(Nadvi, et al. 2004b: 117-18). 
Based on its initial positive experience with trade liberalization domestic support 
could be mobilized in Viet Nam for further free trade agreements such as with ASEAN (the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of AFTA) and for WTO accession in 2007. AFTA was 
aimed at allowing regional specialization within ASEAN, and in particular to allow 
multinationals to produce components for complex products like automobiles in different 
ASEAN countries. These strategies require easy and cheap cross-border transhipment of 
components. But AFTA did not create any new learning rents and so did not create strong 
incentives for multinationals to locate higher technology production sites in Viet Nam.  
By the time Viet Nam joined the WTO there were no significant learning rents to 
be captured through preferential trade agreements because most significant competitors 
were also signing up to free trade agreements with advanced countries. The benefit for 
Viet Nam were largely limited to the possibility of responding to false anti-dumping claims 
made by some importing countries like the USA and even that was limited by Viet Nam’s 
status as a non-market economy that is likely to last till 2018 (Joint Donors 2007: 49-58). 
The effect of these free trade agreements in promoting labour-intensive sectors has 
therefore been more muted exactly as we would expect.  
While trade-related rents are now rarely available to induce learning, the market 
failures in learning and technology acquisition remain. This is widely recognized and 
many policy advisors recommend that Viet Nam should spend more resources on public 
education programmes to ensure that workers are better educated. For instance, the 
proportion of university educated workers in the workforce was only 2 per cent in Viet 
Nam compared to 5 per cent in China and 8 per cent in India (Harvard Vietnam Program 
2008: 27). However, we know that formal education is no guarantee of higher 
productivity in the workplace, which only comes from learning-by-doing. The fact that 
formal education is not sufficient for industrial performance is shown by India’s relative 
performance in manufacturing compared to China, or indeed the relatively poor 
performance of the Philippines in East Asia (ADB 2007: 317-38).  
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 Thus, an important challenge for developing countries like Viet Nam is how to 
continue to finance learning-by-doing when preferential trade rents have disappeared. It is 
very likely that new low technology industries will continue to get informal rents to enable 
them to set up. These could be through land or credit allocations or in other forms. Without 
such implicit rents new startups may be difficult, but the competition to capture these rents 
may induce forms of state-constraining rent seeking and corruption. Again, a better 
understanding of the challenges may assist governments to mitigate possible negative effects 
by developing institutional capabilities to allocate these rents in growth-enhancing ways.  
5.3. FDI-driven growth but constrained technology acquisition  
Viet Nam has benefited from being in a high-growth region where multinationals, 
particularly Japanese ones, have been interested in looking for new countries to diversify 
production. As foreign investors began to arrive during the 1980s, Viet Nam acquired a 
reputation for its hard-working workforce. Preferential trade agreements dramatically 
increased the incentives for foreign investors to move into Viet Nam in the late 1990s 
and beyond and created a spurt of new investments in areas like garments, footwear and 
electronic assembly. Japanese multinationals have been significant investors looking at 
Viet Nam as part of their regional plans. At the same time, there are persistent 
observations that foreign investors in Viet Nam are constrained by the absence of a clear 
policy framework that would create strong incentives for them to invest in upgrading 
technologies (Ohno 2006). 
Although investments by foreign investors have primarily been in export-oriented 
labour intensive industries, it is important to recognize that a number of rents were at 
play here too. Temporary trade-related rents created by fortuitous preferential trade 
agreements were clearly important for attracting foreign investment in some export-
oriented sectors. In addition, foreign investors were able access land and other critical 
resources relatively rapidly, compared to procedures in many other developing countries. 
As they were not buying land in well-working land markets, the ability of the state, 
particularly of local level state authorities to make land allocation decisions quickly and to 
make other necessary assets and resources available was clearly an important attraction 
for investors seeking new low cost investment sites.  
Implicitly, the availability of land at a total cost (including the transaction cost) that 
was significantly lower than in the actual and highly imperfect market was a source of 
rents that foreign investors could access, possibly through local partners with contacts 
(Belser 2000: 7-8). Finally, some foreign investors were also attracted by protected 
domestic markets to invest in capital-intensive production processes serving domestic 
markets with rents. In the late 1990s, 70 per cent of foreign investment was producing for 
domestic sectors where the effective rate of protection was higher than 50 per cent 
(Belser 2000: 27). All of these rents clearly helped in both attracting new foreign 
investment and also in inducing some technology transfers. Viet Nam’s success in 
attracting FDI is reflected in the fact that in the 1990s, FDI amounted to 5.4 per cent of 
Viet Nam’s GDP, compared to 1.1 per cent in China, which received the biggest FDI in 
aggregate (Joint Donors 2001: Table 1.1). In 2006 Viet Nam received a staggering 10.2 
billion dollars in FDI, about half as much as the total for India, a country thirteen times 
bigger in terms of population. The impact of these foreign investments was very positive 
for the local economies. Multinational investments have been found in some studies to 
be a stronger predictor of provincial per capita income growth even more than export 
performance (Ngoc and Ramstetter 2006). The question for Viet Nam is how to sustain 
these processes and move further up the value chain. Once again, understanding the 
role of temporary rents and the importance of managing these implicit and often hidden 
rents is likely to play a key role in sustaining growth in countries like Viet Nam.  
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 As Ohno (2006) has pointed out, at the very least, Viet Nam must have a 
consistent structure of dialogue with foreign investors to find out what types of policy 
changes are needed to make some types of longer-term investments more likely. In 
addition, it is important for Viet Nam to develop a strategy of developing local enterprises 
and capabilities. It may be difficult today to use local content requirements, but it is 
possible to achieve similar results by having an integrated strategy where incentives are 
created for domestic firms to enter as subcontractors or component suppliers. The 
incentives and opportunities created in turn have to be managed to ensure that moral 
hazard and damaging rent seeking including value reducing ‘state-constraining’ 
corruption do not derail these specific strategies. It is in such a context that carefully 
designed strategies and complementary governance capabilities and anti-corruption 
strategies need to be developed to achieve the desired results.  
Viet Nam has also been a fortunate recipient of significant amounts of foreign aid. 
Donors have responded to the capacity of the Vietnamese state to target aid for pro-poor 
spending by granting significant amounts of aid in the form of budget support. This ‘rent’ for 
the Vietnamese economy has allowed Viet Nam to use aid for welfare improving pro-poor 
spending and this is likely to have assisted its political stability. This source of rents has 
therefore also been a contributor to Viet Nam’s growth story in an indirect sense, by 
allowing a greater part of domestic tax revenue and savings to be used for financing growth. 
Donor concerns with the misuse of aid reflect fiduciary responsibilities to their 
taxpayers at home who have very limited tolerance of tax-financed aid being 
misappropriated. Donor agencies have therefore adopted good governance priorities not 
only because they promise to improve market efficiency but also because the anti-
corruption and accountability parts of the programme promise to reduce the risk of aid 
misappropriation. To the extent that developing countries like Viet Nam wish to continue 
to receive significant inflows of aid, some progress in limiting the expropriation and 
misuse of aid is both necessary and desirable. The suspension of Japanese aid to Viet 
Nam in November 2008 after a Japanese contractor admitted it had paid a substantial 
bribe to a Vietnamese official is a case in point. Greater transparency in the allocation of 
contracts funded by aid and in the targeting of aid-funded services will help to assure 
taxpayers in donor countries. But here donors too must be realistic in assisting 
developing countries to achieve governance capabilities that are relevant. It is potentially 
feasible for developing countries to improve the governance of aid programmes to make 
predatory types of corruption less likely here. But donors should not necessarily expect 
these policies to achieve a significant reduction of corruption across the board in the 
short to medium term.  
6. Conclusions 
Viet Nam has enjoyed a period of labour-intensive growth that was the product 
not just of market opportunities created by opening up, but also of a range of deliberate 
and fortuitous ‘responses’ to market failures that allowed the development of new 
capabilities to take advantage of these opportunities. These responses to market failures 
can be viewed through the lens of different types of rents that emerged through 
conscious policies but also often as a result of fortuitous rent creation and institutional 
adaptation. In some cases the rents created incentives and opportunities for investment, 
learning and the adoption and adaptation of new technology. In other cases the rents 
signalled waste and lost opportunities. As rents are always associated with forms of rent 
seeking, the analysis of different types of corruption provides a lens through which to 
understand some of the growth-enhancing governance challenges facing Viet Nam. The 
reform task is to learn from these responses about the types of and responses to market 
failures in Viet Nam, and to improve and extend the scope of learning processes to move 
further up the value chain.  
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 This approach can help to indirectly address the problem of prioritizing different 
types of anti-corruption policies. Our analysis and all the available evidence suggest that 
the overall reduction of corruption is a long-term process in developing countries. 
However, there are many types of corruption that are particularly damaging for sustaining 
the growth process. A governance reform process that focuses on the development of 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities will necessarily have to attack damaging 
types of state-constraining corruption and predatory corruption. A growth-enhancing anti-
corruption strategy can be successful in accelerating growth if it targets these types of 
corruption even if there is no observable effect on aggregate corruption. This indirect 
approach to corruption is also likely to have greater political resonance in poor countries 
where anti-corruption has become a sensitive political issue that is often used to criticize 
governments without offering meaningful strategies which even well-meaning 
governments can feasibly implement. 
Governance capability development is more likely to attract the attention of 
policy-makers if the priorities identified make sense in terms of the experiences of the 
country. This is one reason why beginning with a better understanding of the market 
failures that actually affected Viet Nam, and the different types of responses that have 
partially mitigated some of these market failures is a good place to start the policy 
discussion. This paper has drawn on the available literature but there are clearly still 
many gaps in our understanding of how some of the critical market failures were ‘worked 
around’ during Viet Nam’s first stage of growth. A better understanding of how and to 
what extent capital, land, labour and technology market failures were actually addressed 
would be a very useful background for engaging policy-makers to think about the most 
pressing market failures and therefore the governance capabilities that need to be 
developed to address these market failures. In turn, this will require attention to ensure 
that damaging variants of state-constraining become less likely by focusing on 
appropriate institutional and governance capabilities, and creating a broader 
understanding of these issues within the political leadership and broader society.  
Viet Nam scores worse than some of its comparator countries in terms of rule of 
law and corruption, to the extent that subjective indicators provide any indication of 
relative governance performance (Figure 10 on page 21 and Figure 11 on page 21). But 
paradoxically, Investment Climate Assessments for 2006 report that the overall cost of 
bribes is only around 0.4 per cent of sales and most businesses report that corruption is 
a ‘manageable’ problem (Joint Donors 2007: 163-4). The Provincial Competitiveness 
Index (PCI) which estimates the actual time spent on red tape in Viet Nam finds this to 
be relatively low compared to the World Bank’s Doing Business Surveys which estimates 
notional time wasted as estimated from the number of procedures that have to be 
completed (Joint Donors 2007: 23-5). This observation suggests that private sector 
businesses in Viet Nam are mainly exposed to relatively benign forms of market-
restricting corruption (the first type of corruption in Figure 5). 
In contrast, state-constraining corruption is likely to be very important in Viet Nam 
given the wide range of rents that have driven growth in the recent past. Some of this 
state-constraining corruption is likely to be profit-sharing between public officials and 
businesses when valuable rents are allocated. Where these rents play a productive role 
the overall effect of the corruption may be relatively small. If this type of corruption is to 
be addressed legal and regulated methods of solving market failures (and therefore for 
creating and managing rents) have to be devised. However, some of the state-
constraining corruption is damaging because in these cases corruption adversely affects 
the allocation or monitoring of the rents, resulting in poor outcomes or the creation of 
growth-reducing rents. In these cases the development of regulatory capabilities to limit 
these adverse outcomes is even more of a priority.  
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 In developing countries, economic and political powers are often closely 
connected. As a result, the processes of political bargaining and redistribution that 
involve elements of political corruption are likely to overlap with the allocation of 
potentially beneficial economic rents that are involved in state-constraining corruption. 
Compared to other developing countries where political competition is more likely to be 
between political parties and factions and therefore more transparent, in Viet Nam these 
factions are within a single party, the Communist Party and more difficult for outsiders to 
observe. Nevertheless, the allocation of rents and privileges in response to political 
bargaining within the party is likely to involve rents that also have broader economic 
consequences. For instance, the internal bargaining within the Communist Party 
between individuals, regions and groups could determine the type and allocation of rents 
to different SOEs or private sector firms. Therefore some analysis of these internal 
political bargains may be necessary to understand the types of state-constraining 
corruption, and the extent to which they allow or prevent the allocation of necessary 
economic rents in efficient ways. 
Viet Nam’s system of relatively closed internal policy formulation may not be easy 
to change in the near future, but it may not be necessary either from the perspective of 
sustaining growth in the medium term. The good governance claim that open and 
transparent government is a necessary condition for market efficiency is belied by the 
experience of many countries in recent history, from South Korea and Taiwan in the 
1960s to China today. Greater transparency can assist some types of growth-enhancing 
interventions in some countries, while making other types of interventions more difficult in 
some contexts. The East Asian experience suggests that the withdrawal of rents from 
non-performing firms may have been easier in a context where these firms could not 
lobby extensively and purchase allies in an open political system. It is difficult to say in 
general whether transparency will always be useful, necessary or sufficient for greater 
efficiency in the allocation of rents. Nevertheless, the transition to greater political 
openness may be desirable for other reasons. Given the desirability of transparency in 
itself, an agenda for achieving greater transparency can in general be supported. From 
the perspective of growth-enhancing capabilities, it is important that Vietnamese policy-
makers themselves understand the nature of the bargaining that is going on so that they 
can ensure that some of the most vital rent allocation and rent-management decisions 
are not left to the arbitrary push and pull of internal forces. If some of these critical 
decisions can be made on growth-enhancing criteria, it may be very feasible for the 
internal politics of the Communist Party to sustain growth even with gradual 
improvements in transparency.  
Finally, the evidence that is available does not suggest that Viet Nam suffers 
excessively from the worst type of corruption: predation and theft. Some instances can 
no doubt be found but there is no evidence that it is widespread, let alone the dominant 
type of corruption. This does not mean that we should ignore this problem. Some 
aspects of theft of aid resources demonstrate elements of theft, perhaps closely 
associated with political power and therefore internal political bargains within the Party. A 
greater awareness of the processes through which these happen can help to develop 
governance capabilities that limit the damage caused by these scandals. 
The analysis sketched in this paper can provide a framework for further research 
into how specific types of corruption can constrain growth. In each case, the analysis 
suggests that different types of governance reforms and capabilities may be appropriate 
to address that specific type of corruption. The analysis also suggests that a general 
approach to anti-corruption may not be very useful in developing countries. On the other 
hand, an approach that identifies a limited number of areas where corruption can 
potentially play very damaging roles is more likely to achieve results and contribute to 
growth by improving the management and allocation of necessary rents while limiting the 
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 creation of damaging rents. The main areas of focus for further research could include 
the following: 
i) A major area of concern in developing countries is the issue of land rights and 
the availability of land for valuable investments in emerging sectors. As land rights are 
typically poorly defined in developing countries (and Viet Nam faces specific challenges 
given its transition from a statist development model) non-market transfers of land can 
create significant rents for those who receive these allocations. Land allocation systems 
in all developing countries are therefore subject to both state-constraining corruption as 
well as political corruption. These allocations may be associated with growth-enhancing 
land allocations or the reverse. A better understanding of how the interface of evolving 
land rights, political rent seeking and/or corruption and state strategies for allocating this 
valuable resource to emerging sectors can identify critical areas where growth-enhancing 
governance needs to be strengthened. It can also identify areas of potentially seriously 
damaging rent seeking and corruption which need to be addressed if the long run growth 
trajectory of the country is to be maintained. This approach is likely to be much more 
helpful than the simplistic governance agenda of strengthening property rights on land. 
The latter is part of the good governance agenda, but the international evidence shows 
that it is very difficult to make significant improvements in the protection and definition of 
property rights in early stage developers. In the meantime, the growth-enhancing 
strategy is to work with existing rights and strengthen the growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities of states to ensure that land is allocated to growth-enhancing sectors, that 
political stability is maintained by achieving fair and adequate compensations to those 
who are asked to part with their land, and that policy-makers have an adequate metric for 
comparing the value of alternative uses of land in making land allocation decisions. As 
growth continues, gradual moves towards better property rights on land can 
simultaneously be pursued.  
ii) The allocation of rents to SOEs can be potentially growth sustaining or growth 
retarding. A better mapping of how rents are being allocated to major SOEs in Viet Nam 
and the uses that are made of these rents can assist state policy-makers to allocate 
these rents more rationally and to hold SOEs to account. The simplistic policy position 
which says that SOEs should not have access to rents or that SOEs should be privatized 
is not likely to be helpful in the context of developing countries facing significant market 
failures. A better approach would be to map the uses and misuses of rents in SOEs and 
to assist countries like Viet Nam to strengthen their growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities so that SOEs can be assisted to drive growth over the longer term.  
iii) The framework proposed in this paper can also be used to assess the likely 
social gains of standard anti-corruption and governance strategies. For instance, an 
undue emphasis on subjective governance indicators that are very volatile and which 
combine perceptions of many different types of corruption is unlikely to provide useful 
information for policy-makers. The aggregate corruption index for poor countries is likely 
to remain unfavorable for some time. The person on the street is unlikely to have an 
adequate framework for distinguishing between different types of corruption in a 
reasonable way. Indeed we have seen that high growth and low growth developing 
countries both suffer from significant aggregate corruption. The task of research is to 
provide detailed case study based evidence of specific types of corruption that are 
damaging and design policies to address these. The challenge for countries like Viet 
Nam is that although they have grown reasonably rapidly in the past, if adequate policies 
are not in place to ensure that growth-reducing types of corruption and rent seeking are 
addressed, growth can easily collapse over time. But a broad-based approach that seeks 
to address all types of corruption immediately is also likely to fail. 
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